JSQ
Talks
[up]
[prev] [next]
a persistent phishing cluster
   NCFS,
   Orlando
   2 Nov
   2006
F2CCamp
   Austin
   26 September
   2006
IEEE
   Net Neutrality
   Austin
   21 September
   2006
Armadillocon,
   Austin
   12 August
   2006
Metricon,
   Vancouver
   1 Aug
   2006
Agora,
   Seattle
   16 June
   2006
RSNZ,
   Wellington
   17 Nov
   2005
TRISC,
   Austin
   20 Sep
   2005
APWG,
   London
   19 April
   2005
RSA
   San Francisco
   17 Feb
   2005
InnoTech
   Austin
   3 Nov
   2004
LinuCon
   Austin
   9 Oct
   2004
Internet2
   Austin
   29 Sep
   2004
Supernova
   Santa Clara
   24 June
   2004
SXSW 20040315
   SXSW
   Austin
   15 March
   2004
CACTUS
   Austin
   18 Sep
   2003
TPRC
   Arlington,
   VA
   19-21 Sept
   2003
AIP
   Austin
   18 June
   2003
EFF
   Austin
   15 April
   2003
NGN,
   Boston,
   14-18
   Oct
   2002
MIT
   Wireless
   Forum,
   NYC,
   15 Oct
   2002
TPRC,
   VA,
   28-30
   Sep
   2002
DCSB,
   Boston,
   4 June
   2002
 

NCFS 16-17 November 2006

PhishScope: Tracking Phish Server Clusters

John S. Quarterman, InternetPerils, Inc.
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) 2006 eCrime Researchers Summit
National Center for Forensic Science (NCFS)
Orlando, FL, Orlando University Hotel, 16-17 November 2006

Abstract

Phishing often seems an intractable problem, because phishers go to such lengths to hide their tracks by staging their attacks through multiple countries and legal regimes. Targets of phishing and law enforcement thus have few levers to use with phishing.

This paper demonstrates such a lever: a method (PhishScope) of identification ofcurrent clusters of active phishing servers that are all connected to the same part of the same ISP, and thus are in the same legal regime. Targets of phishing can use information about such phishing server clusters to urge ISPs to do something about them. An ISP infested by a phishing cluster may not know that, so such information may be all it takes to persuade an ISP to do something. Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) may not want to expend effort on a single phishing report, but a cluster of phishing servers, especially one that involves multiple targets of phishing, is worth expenditure of resources. Information about such phishing clusters is thus leverageable for proactive intervention by targets of phishing, by ISPs infested by phishing servers, and by LEAs.

Another persistent phishing cluster.


Last changed: $Date: 2006/10/11 19:17:06 $ JSQ